to observe this gap, combined with the outflanking of the
royal army's left wing, that made Cope and his officers all
the more ready to accept the over-estimate of the Highland
army's strength.*
Meanwhile the reserve had still to make its way through the
marsh, and Lord George sent off Johnstone to see that it did
so without noise or confusion. All went well, but to cross
the ditch the Prince attempted to leap over it, and fell forward
on to his knees on the muddy far bank. Taking him by the arm
Johnstone helped him to his feet, and from the expression
on the Prince's face it seemed to him that Charles considered
the accident a bad omen.
On reaching the plain the reserve drew up some 50 yards in
rear of the front line, and to safeguard his flank Lord George
Murray gave orders for one of the three reserve regiments
to move up between the Camerons and the marsh. Owing, however,
to the distance his A.D.C. had to cover on foot, and the short
interval of time before the attack began, these orders failed
to arrive.
One point to which Cope attached particular importance was
the fact that fit the beginning of the action his army was
fully formed. That this was true there can be no doubt, not
only from the state- ments of eye-witnesses on both sides
but from the inferences to be drawn from certain incidents.
From 3 o'clock onwards, when his patrols first reported the
eastward movement of the Highland reserve. Cope had been aware
that something was in the wind, and on receiving the dragoons'
report of the threat to his left wing he at once ordered one
of the i@-pounders to be fired as an alarm gun to recall the
out-guards. According to Eicho this signal was heard just
as the reserve was passing through the defile at the Riggonhead
farm, while Johnstone, who was with the Prince, says that
the reserve was 'not yet out of the marsh, when the enemy,
seeing our first line in order of battle, fired an alarm gun'.
Though not fully in agreement both at any rate make it clear
that, at the time the royal |
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