on his own ground, and that even under such favourable conditions
was unable to avoid defeat.
A more sensible suggestion of Gardiner's was that the artillery
should be sited in the centre of the line, rather than on
one or other of the wings near the cavalry, 'where he was
apprehensive, that the Horses, which had not been in any Engagement
before, might be thrown into some Disorder by the Discharge
so very near them'. There would seem to be no good reason
why this suggestion was not adopted, for apart from their
effect on the horses, it would have been tactically sounder
to have stationed the guns and mortars in the centre. Not
only would they have been less isolated, but their fire would
have covered a wider front.
By the time that the Atholl Brigade had returned to its former
ground it was becoming dark, and Cope ordered the royal army
to take up position for the night on a line running parallel
to the large ditch, and a little to the east of the one it
had occupied earlier in the afternoon. Excepting that the
whole of the artillery was posted on the left, the original
'Order of Battle' remained unaltered so far as the front line
was concerned, but in the rear the reserve now con- sisted
only of a single squadron belonging to each of the cavalry
regiments. This change was the result of Cope's decision to
replace the 100 regulars, who had hitherto formed the baggage-guard,
by his 180 Highlanders, most of whom were newly-raised and
untrained. From his previous experiences he may also have
had doubts about their loyalty, and later that evening have
felt no great regret as he watched them march off with the
baggage and the military chest to an enclosure on the south
side of Cockenzie. The volunteers forming the rest of the
infantry reserve were still less reliable, and as few of them
were properly clad for spending the night in the open. Cope
dismissed them with orders to report at dawn the following
morning. In doing so he was to save many young lives, for
not more than a handful arrived in time to take part in the
battle.
In spite of Home's estimate two days earlier that the Highland
army numbered under 2,000 men. Cope and his officers had a
vastly exaggerated idea of its strength. One of them, who
had reconnoitred the Highlanders during their march up Falside
Hill, had put it at over 5,000 men, and 'about 5,000' was
the estimate of Mr. Baillie, steward to the Solicitor-General,
'who had been in among the Rebels' that evening. Later, at
Cope's 'Examination', Whitefoord |
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