|
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS OF
SUCCESS
THE past twelve months have witnessed a significant movement,
under which extended efforts have been made to withdraw
a portion of the public-house trade of the country from
private hands. These months have seen the formation of Public-house
Trust Companies in Great Britain and Ireland under the leadership
of Earl Grey, the rapid extension of the People's Refreshment-House
Association, formed in 1896 by the Bishop of Chester and
Major Craufurd, and of other similar enterprises upon a
smaller scale. In all these Companies it is provided that
the dividends of the shareholder shall be limited to 4 or
5 per cent, per annum, and that the surplus profits shall
be appropriated to objects of public utility. (Already
(July 6th, 1901) it is announced that "Arrangements
have been, or are being, completed for the formation of
Public-house Trust Companies in the following localities
: The East of Scotland, Glasgow, Renfrewshire, Northumberland,
Kent, and Belfast. Preliminary steps to that end have also
been taken in Bradford, Durham, Essex, Leeds, Liverpool,
Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Surrey, Sussex, Warwickshire,
and Hertfordshire." )
It is difficult to determine the full import of this movement,
but it almost certainly marks a perception of the futility
of all attempts to exercise effective restriction and control
over the public-house trade so long as it continues in private
hands. It marks also a growing sense of the absurdity of
permitting the enormous profits of a monopoly created by
the State to pass into private hands.
And, beyond all doubt, the rapid extension of these company
experiments bears witness to the universal feeling that
" something must be done" to stay the evils of
intemperance. Their formation has been welcomed by a large
portion of the press, and they have enlisted the support
of many men of wide influence who have hitherto stood aloof
from the temperance movement. Impatient of the endless delays
in legislation, conscious that the Trade is year by year
entrenching itself more firmly and promptly occupying all
new ground, the promoters of these companies have determined
to do what they can under the existing law, and, if possible,
to ensure that any new licences granted shall be held as
a trust in the interest of the public, and not be handed
over to private individuals to be used for private gain.
Public opinion will support the appeal of Lord Grey in his
letter to the licensing magistrates in the various Petty
Sessional Divisions of Northumberland, that, if they can
see their way to do so, they shall offer him, " on
behalf of the People's Refreshment-House Association, or
some kindred organisation, the refusal of any new licence
they may be disposed to grant, before they confer it upon
a licensee under conditions which will enable him to lawfully
appropriate to his own pocket profits which, under the plan
I propose, would accrue to the community."
It is well, however, to recognise from the outset the limitations
which, until a large measure of temperance reform has been
carried, must necessarily attach to these experiments, and
the difficulties, in some directions almost insuperable,
under which they will be conducted.
These difficulties have already been experienced in the
rural experiments that for some years past have been carried
on in different parts of the country; they will press even
more heavily upon the Trust Company houses which it is proposed
to open in the towns. The true character of these difficulties
will probably best appear in a review of the conditions
that are essential to the success of company control.
CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN COMPANY CONTROL
The fullest evidence as to these conditions is to be obtained
from an examination of the working of the system in Norway
and Sweden, where it has been carried on for more than thirty
years under the guidance of able and disinterested men.
Before, however, we tabulate this evidence, the question
should be answered: What is the success that is sought?
Is it merely to have an orderly public-house in which drunkenness
shall be forbidden, in which the licence law shall be observed,
in which no credit shall be given, in which gambling and
all immoral accessories shall be done away with, in which,
in short, the present consumption of alcohol (or that part
of it which is not distinctly intemperate in character)
shall be carried on, though under improved conditions ?
Is this the whole of the success that is sought, or does
the success aimed at go further and seek to bring about
a substantial reduction in the normal consumption ?
This question is fundamental, as upon the answer that is
given to it will probably depend the lines of policy of
the Trust Companies. It is often assumed that the problem
to be solved is solely one of intemperance, by which we
mean flagrant and manifest excess, and that apart from this
the normal consumption of alcohol calls for no special attention
on the part of statesmen and temperance reformers. But surely
this view of the problem is inadequate, if on no other grounds,
certainly on this, that it leaves out of consideration the
serious economic danger that results from the present average
expenditure upon alcohol! The present writers have elsewhere
(The Temperance Problem and Social Reform) conclusively
shown that the average family expenditure of the working
classes in this country upon drink cannot be less than six
shillings per week—a sum that is probably more than
one-sixth of their average family income. This expenditure
clearly leaves no sufficient margin for the maintenance
of that standard of physical and mental efficiency which
is now seen to be of primary importance in the industrial
competition of nations. In view of this fact it would seem
to be self-evident that no experiment could be considered
really " successful" that did not bring about
a substantial reduction in the normal expenditure upon drink.
With this preamble we may consider what in Norway and Sweden
have been -found to be the conditions of success in company
management.
1. The elimination of private profit from the sale of
drink.
This principle carries us further than is sometimes seen.
Not only must the actual dispenser of the drink have no
pecuniary interest in the amount of liquor sold, but the
manager of a company who appoints and determines the position
of the staff should also know that his salary is independent
of sales. This vital principle of the elimination of private
profit would also be invaded if those from whom the liquor
is bought could as shareholders or directors influence the
policy of the company.
2. Public cupidity must not take the place of private
cupidity, and to this end the appropriation of the profits
must be determined by clear statutory law.
The experience of the Scandinavian countries upon this
point is exceedingly suggestive. In Gothenburg, as is well
known, the city rates are aided by the profits of the Bolag,(Bolag
is the Swedish, and Samlag the Norwegian, word for "
Company.") and an amount equal to about one-third
of the total municipal revenue is annually received from
this source. The ratepayers of the city have thus a direct
interest in encouraging the sale of liquor. The enlightened
founders of the system did not intend that the profits should
be so used, but were driven to accept this arrangement owing
to the absence of statutory law determining their appropriation.
In Norway the company system was introduced later than in
Sweden. The Norwegians recognised the danger lurking in
the Swedish system, and the Norwegian law of 1871, under
which the companies were established, expressly provided
that the profits of the Samlags should be devoted to "
objects of public utility." It was further provided
that the bye-laws of each Samlag should be approved by the
central Government. This system was admittedly far better
than the Swedish, yet the temperance reformers of Norway
justly regarded with apprehension a scheme under which ordinary
charities and valuable town improvements were dependent
upon the profits of the local drink traffic. To guard against
this danger the temperance party were able to embody in
the Act of 1894 a change in the method of appropriating
profits under which 65 per cent, of the whole now goes to
the State. In both countries there has been but an imperfect
recognition of the need for providing upon an extensive
scale out of the profits of the trade counter-attractions
to the public-house.
3. In any town in which a Company is established it
must have a monopoly of the retail licences, both "
on " and " of."
This monopoly is essential to the full success of the company
system. In reducing the hours of sale, in the non-serving
of young persons below the age of eighteen, in prohibiting
sales on credit, in abolishing adventitious attractions
in their houses, and in many other ways the controlling
companies have been able to exercise a powerful restrictive
influence; but such influence obviously could not have been
exercised if within a few doors from the company shops other
licensed houses had been open in which none of these restrictions
were enforced. The companies, with few exceptions (those
which do occur are mischievous), have a complete monopoly
of the sale of spirits, but unfortunately neither in Sweden
nor in Norway is beer included within the scope of the controlling
system. By common consent this is its weakest point. The
Scandinavian experience distinctly points to the need of
a monopoly extending to the retail sale of all kinds of
alcoholic liquor.
4. The system must provide for the full liberation of
the progressive sentiment in a locality.
" There can be little doubt," to quote words
which the present writers have used elsewhere, (Preface
to The Temperance Problem and Social Reform) "that
if temperance reform is to advance upon the ordinary lines
of social progress in this country, it must do so by giving
the localities a large measure of self-government in relation
to the drink traffic, and, subject to the observance of
a few conditions to be laid down by Parliament, everything
is to be gained by the grant of such liberty. The public
opinion of the large towns, with their intelligence and
municipal spirit quickened by the possession of power to
deal effectively with intemperance, will shape itself in
definite forms. But there must be a real liberation of the
local forces."
This liberation of the local forces can be accomplished
under a system of company control if the company is in close
association with the municipal government, as in Norway
and Sweden. In the Bergen Samlag, for instance, out of forty
members of the committee of management twenty-five are chosen
by the shareholders and fifteen by the municipal council.
The committee, therefore, acts with full knowledge of the
wishes and opinions of the locality. The close association
of the Samlag with the municipal council is further maintained
by the fact that the latter, in conjunction with the magistracy,
are (subject to the veto of the State governor) the licensing
authority from whom the companies at the expiration of each
quinquennial period have to apply for the renewal of their
licence. A controlling company so constituted is a responsible
body—responsible, in the first instance, to the municipality,
and through it to the local community. This system is quickly
responsive to an enlightened public opinion. The temperance
reformer can influence it either by direct service on the
city council or by furthering the return of those in whose
policy he concurs.
5. Lastly, if these Companies are to achieve any high
success they must be conducted as undertakings having for
their object a distinct temperance end, to ivhich commercial
considerations must be strictly subordinated.
It may be confidently asserted that the success of the
various controlling companies in Sweden and Norway as agencies
for the advance of temperance has been proportionate to
the degree in which they have carried out the five principles
enumerated above. The efficacy of these principles does
not depend upon anything peculiar to the Scandinavian soil;
they would be as potent in this country as elsewhere. If
kept steadily in mind they should aid us in forming an opinion
of the value, as temperance agencies, of the companies which
have been or are about to be formed in this country.
|
Back 